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EXHIBIT A
MOTION FOR APPORTIONMENT OF
FAULT OF SALT LAKE CITY (R 100 - 101)

ROBERT L. STEVENS [A3105]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER,
Plaintiff,

*

*
*

MOTION FOR APPORTIONMENT OP
FAULT OF SALT LAKE CITY

vs.
AMY NELSON,
Defendant.

*

Civil No. C91-1901

*

Judge Frederick

Defendant, by and through her attorney of record, moves
the court for its order determining that the verdict form at
trial in this case will include an apportionment of fault to Salt
Lake City Corporation.
As a basis for this motion, defendant shows the court
that discovery has demonstrated that Salt Lake City Corporation
was partially or completely at fault in causing the accident
which is the subject of this action.

This motion is supported by

the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities.

-A^-^

1992.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

*T L^/STEV^
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE
foregoin
this
record:

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
nstrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on
day of
/>*^7, , 1992, to the following counsel of
Ford G. Scalley
John E. Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Jfa^/foafi&
'/totm?,*-^
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EXHIBIT B
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION ON JURY VERDICT
FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT (R 112 - 118)

ROBERT L. STEVENS [A3105]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-1777

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER,
Plaintiff,

vs.
AMY NELSON,
Defendant.

*
4
*
*
*
*
*
*

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IM SUPPORT OF
INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION OM JURY VERDICT
FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT
Civil No. C91-1901
Judge Frederick

FACTS
1.

This action arises out of an automobile accident

that occurred on July 6, 1989 at the intersection of 3rd Avenue
and Canyon Road in Salt Lake City.

The accident resulted when

defendant did not stop at a stop sign and entered the
intersection and collided with plaintiff.
2.

There is evidence in this case that the stop sign

was bent prior to the accident and was obscured by tree limbs.
The limbs were cleared a day or two later.

0112

3.

Defendant will present evidence and expert opinion

to the effect that because of the obstructed stop sign, defendant
was not aware and would not reasonably have been aware that she
needed to stop and, therefore, fault lies with Salt Lake City for
failing to maintain the stop sign.
4.

Plaintiff's Complaint was not filed until March 21,

1991, more than a year and a half after the accident.
Consequently, plaintiff's action against the City was time barred
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act by the time the Complaint
was filed.
ARGUMENT
UNDER UTAH COMPETITIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW, IT 18 APPROPRIATE TO
CONSIDER THE FAULT OF ALL RESPONSIBLE PARTIES SO THAT
LIABILITY AGAINST DEFENDANT NELSON IS RESTRICTED
TO HER OWN DEGREE OF FAULT.
Prior to the passage of the Tort Reform Act of 1986,
Utah law provides for joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors.

This created numerous inequitable situations where a

party who bore a limited degree of fault was compelled to pay for
the fault of the other joint tort-feasor as well as his own. The
Reform Act of 1986 was passed to remedy this inequity.
The Act specifically provides that a negligent party
shall only pay for his own proportion of fault.
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall
not alone bar recovery by that person. He
may recover from any defendant or group of
2
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defendants whose fault exceeds his own.
However, no defendant is liable to anv person
seeking recovery for anv amount in excess of
the proportion of fault attributable to that

defendantS 78-27-38, Utah Code Ann. (Emphasis added).
The Tort Reform Act went on to eliminate any right of
contribution between joint tort-feasors.

Section 78-27-40# Utah

Code Annotated, provides:
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum
amount for which a defendant may be liable to
any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of
fault attributed to that defendant. No
defendant is entitled to contribution from
any other person. (Emphasis added.)
The statutory scheme requires that all of the joint
tort-feasors who are potentially at fault be included on the
verdict form.

Without that inclusion, a result totally contrary

to the statutory scheme is possible.
For example, in the instant case, a jury could conclude
that plaintiff was without fault.

They could also conclude that

the stop sign was obscured but that defendant Nelson still should
have been traveling at a lower speed or in some other manner had
a small degree of fault of 5 to 10 percent.

Under the standard

verdict form, a jury is forced to treat all of the fault
presented to them as 100 percent.
3

If they consider plaintiff's

fault to be zero and if no other persons were on the verdict
form, they would be forced to conclude that defendant Nelson was
100 percent at fault.

Defendant Nelson would end up paying for

100 percent of plaintiff's judgment when, in fact, she was only
responsible for 5 to 10 percent of the judgment.

She would then

have no right to sue for contribution.
Other responsible persons must be included on the
verdict form.

Otherwise, defendant Nelson could pay more than

her share in violation of the statute and its purpose.
Plaintiff will doubtless point to Section 78-27-41
regarding joinder of defendants and claim that the city should
have been joined earlier.

The fact is, however, that the statute

says such parties may be joined as defendants.
mandatory.

It is not

The overall statutory scheme is not conditioned on

whether such defendants are joined.

In fact, the statute defines

"defendant" as any person not immune from suit who is claimed to
be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.
27-37(1), Utah Code Annotated.

78-

The definition does not require

that the "defendant" actually be a party to the suit.
It is readily apparent that there is no unfair hardship
or prejudice to the plaintiff by including Salt Lake City on the
verdict form.

Defendant Nelson's initial Answer in this matter

raised the defense of the negligence of third parties.

Her

4
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Answers to Interrogatories dated May 23, 1991 included a response
to Interrogatory No. 22 identifying the fact that the stop sign
was bent and partially obscured by foliage.

She repeated this

information at her deposition on July 2, 1991.
Plaintiff has been well aware of the problem with the
stop sign for over nine months.

She has known that this is an

issue relied on by defendant to contest liability.

She cannot

claim unfair surprise.
Whether the City is joined as a defendant in the case
or simply included on the verdict form makes no difference to
plaintiff.

Because of the time bar of the Governmental Immunity

Act at Section 63-30-13, plaintiff has no direct claim against
the City and it could not be a direct defendant.
Whether the City was joined as an additional defendant
under Section 78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated or not has had no
effect on plaintiff and has not prejudiced her in any way.

The

City must be included on the verdict form in order to effectuate
the policy of the Tort Reform Act.
CONCLUSION
In this case, it appears that the joint tort-feasor
with primary liability has not been joined as a defendant.
Nevertheless, the parties have been aware of the existence of the
claim of Salt Lake City's fault for over nine months.

Including

5
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Salt Lake City on the verdict form will not prejudice or
jeopardize plaintiff or deny her any rights. On the other hand,
if Salt Lake City is left off the jury form, defendant Nelson
will be denied the benefit to which she is entitled under the
Utah Tort Reform Act.

The jury would be forced to apportion 100

percent of fault without having all of the tort-feasors before
it, and the purpose and scheme of the Tort Reform Act will be
frustrated.
Defendant's motion to include Salt Lake City on the
verdict form should be granted.

Alternatively, Salt Lake City

should be listed as a defendant and included on the verdict form.
DATED this

day of

-r~^/*>^4~~,

, 1992.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

IT L.
Attorneys for Defendant

6

CgRTIFICATB QF ggRVICB
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was HAND DELIVERED on this 26th day of
February, 1992, to the following counsel of record:
Ford G. Sealley
John E. Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
0
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EXHIBIT C
NOTICE OF HEARING (R 119 - 120)

ROBERT L. STEVENS [A3105]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMY NELSON,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

NOTICE OF HEARING

Civil No. C91-1901
Judge Frederick

TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant's Motion in Limine
and Motion for Apportionment of Fault of Salt Lake City will come
on for hearing on Tuesday, March 3, 1992 at the hour of 9:15 a.m.
before The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the Third
District Court.
DATED this l^-A

day of

\^e6sis«~,

1992.

RICHARDS , BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

ROBERT L. 'STEVENS
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE 07 SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct £opy of the
foregoing instrximent was hand delivered on this p&- day of
fr>b
, 1992, to the following counsel of record:
Ford G. Sealley
John E. Hansen
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

<M ?• Ilukhmi^y

2
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EXHIBIT D
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION ON JURY VERDICT
FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT (R 135 - 138)

FORD G. SCALLEY, #2869
JOHN E. HANSEN, #4590
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMY NELSON,
Defendant.

:
:
:

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
INCLUSION OF SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION ON JURY VERDICT
FOR APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT

:
:
::

Civil No. C91-1901
Judge Frederick

ARGUMENT
THE ONLY APPLICABLE UTAH STATUTE
MANDATES THAT AN ENTITY BE JOINED
AS A PARTY DEFENDANT BEFORE IT CAN
BE ADDED TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT
FORM.
The relevant statute which must be interpreted is Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-41 (1987), entitled -Joinder of defendants,"
and reads as follows:
A person seeking recovery, or any
defendant who is a party to the
litigation, may join as parties any
defendants who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage
for which recovery is sought, for
the purpose of having determined

their respective proportions of
fault.
(Emphasis added.)1
Section 78-27-41 gave Defendant the ability to add Salt
Lake City Corp. ("Salt Lake CityH) to this lawsuit, but Defendant
has chosen not to do so in a timely manner.

If Defendant desired

to add Salt Lake City to this lawsuit for the purposes of having
their respective portion of fault determined, S 78-27-41 provides
the necessary mechanism.

Defendant was not deprived of the

ability to have Salt Lake City added to the Special Verdict Form,
but clearly was required to add it as a party defendant to the
lawsuit before this Court is authorized to add Salt Lake City to
the Special Verdict Form for the purpose of having its respective
portion of fault determined.
Defendant was served with the Complaint in this case on
March 21, 1991, almost a year ago.

In December 1991, the Court

set a trial date for March 4-6, 1992.

The deadline for the

completion of discovery was February 20, 1992. Now on February
26, 1992, less than one week before trial, Defendant has filed a
motion to add Salt Lake City to the Special Verdict Form.

The

problem with adding Salt Lake City to the Special Verdict Form in
this case is created by Defendant's pre-designed strategy or lack
1

This statute was enacted in 1986, repealing the former
statute making pre-1986 case law inapplicable.
2
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of diligence.

To allow Defendant to sit on her right created by

§ 78-27-41 and then at this late date attempt to slip these nonparties onto the Special Verdict Form would create horribly
inequitable results.

Defendant would be placed in the position

of making allegations against an entity who is not a defendant
and not properly defended in the lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
The statutory scheme contemplates only listing
"defendants" and the plaintiff on the Special Verdict Form for
the purposes of apportioning fault.

It provides a mechanism to

allow a defendant to add an additional party as a "defendant" for
the apportionment of fault.

Defendant chose for tactical reasons

not to follow this procedure, instead attempting to add
undefended parties to the Special Verdict Form.
The Court should not allow Defendant to ignore the
statutory scheme and mechanism for adding parties to the Special
Verdict Form.

This would seriously and inappropriately prejudice

Plaintiff Julie Turner.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of March, 1992.
SCALLEy? & READING

Jamil E. Hansen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
/

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Inclusion of Salt Lake City Corporation on Jury
Verdict for Apportionment of Fault to be hand delivered to the
following parties and counsel of record on this 3rd day of March,
1992:
Robert L. Stevens, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah

4
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EXHIBIT E
MINUTE ENTRY (R 139)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
TURNER, JULIE ANDERSON
PLAINTIFF
VS
NELSON, AMY

CASE NUMBER 910901901 PI
DATE 03/03/92
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER ANNA BENNETT
COURT CLERK CLB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
MOTION HEARING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. HANSEN, JOHN E.
D. ATTY. STEVENS, ROBERT L.

PRIOR TO TRIAL, THIS CASE COMES NOW ON BEFORE THE COURT FOR
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS IN LIMINE, ALL PARTIES PRESENT
AND BEING REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AS SHOWN ABOVE. THE VARIOUS
MOTIONS ARE ARGUED TO THE COURT BY RESPECTIVE COUNSEL AND
SUBMITTED. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING FULLY
ADVISED IN THE PREMISES, RULES AS STATED ON THE RECORD.
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EXHIBIT F
MOTION TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO
CALL A NEWLY DISCOVERED
WITNESS, JIM MAKLING, AS A
WITNESS AT TRIAL (R 143 - 160)

Third Judicial District

MAR

5 1992

klLAI

»-&•

Ford G. Scalley, #2869
John E. Hansen, #4590
SCALLEY & READING
Attorney for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO
CALL A NEWLY DISCOVERED
WITNESS, JIM MARLING, AS A
WITNESS AT TRIAL

vs.
AMY NELSON,
Defendant*

Civil No. C91-1901
Judge Frederick

As set forth in the affidavit of counsel attached hereto
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A, " upon the completion of the
first day of trial, and in response to the Court's granting, on the
morning of trial, defendant's motion for apportionment of fault of
Salt Lake City, and based upon defendant's very obvious strategy to
contend that most, if not all, of the blame for this accident must
be placed with Salt Lake City due to the allegedly obstructed stop
sign, plaintiff's counsel has sought out and was successful in
locating a resident in the immediate vicinity of the subject stop
sign, Jim Makling, who has testimony directly relevant to the lack
C:\JEH\PLEADINO\TURNBR.MTA
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of obstruction of the stop sign. Accordingly, plaintiff is filing
this motion prior to commencing the second day of trial, in order
to request that plaintiff be allowed to call Mr. Makling in her
case-in-chief, or at the very least, plaintiff submits that she
should be allowed to call Mr. Makling as a rebuttal witness should
the defense call any witnesses who claim that the stop sign is
obstructed.
Realizing

that

defendant's

counsel

has

not

had

an

opportunity to interview or depose this newly discovered witness,
and in an effort

to give the defendant

fair and reasonable

opportunity to evaluate witness Maklingfs testimony, plaintiff
would agree to allow defendant to interview or take the deposition
of this witness during a break in the proceeding if defendant would
so desire. Plaintiff would then call witness Makling as a rebuttal
witness after defendant presents her case.
This motion is based upon the accompanying affidavit of
counsel as well as the case authority cited in 63 ALR 4th 712,
surprise witnesses—nonexperts.

Section 10 of 63 ALR 4th 712,

found at page 786 and 787 citing cases wherein several courts in
other jurisdictions had held that it was proper to allow or
improper to exclude the testimony of an undisclosed witness where
the calling party's need

C:\JEH\PLEADIHG\TURNER.MTA

for the witness' testimony had not

2
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previously been apparent, is attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference as Exhibit "B."
In conclusion, plaintiff submits that in the interest of
justice, and in order to allow plaintiff to properly respond to the
clearly directed attack in the unrepresented entity Salt Lake City,
plaintiff respectfully submits that she should be allowed to call
this most critical, newly discovered witness, Jim Makling, at
trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th of March, 1992.
SCALLEY.& READING

<^*%i^Si

E. Hansen
torney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICA^g OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of March, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was hand delivered to
the following:
Robert L. Stevens, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Tower, Seventh,Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411

C:\JEH\PLEADIHG\TURNER.MTA
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Ford G. Scalley, #2869
John E. Hansen, #4590
SCALLEY & READING
Attorney for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER,

:

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

:

vs.

:

AMY NELSON,

:

Civil No. C91-1901

:

Judge Frederick

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, John E. Hansen, being first duly sworn, depose and say
as follows:
1.

I am counsel of record for plaintiff, Julie Turner,

in the above-referenced matter.
2.
commencing

On February 26, 1992, less than one week before the
of

this

trial,

defendant

filed

a

motion

for

apportionment of fault of Salt Lake City.

C:\JEH\PLEADINC\TURNER.AFr
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3.
apportion

Prior

fault

of

to
Salt

defendant's

filing

Lake City,

of

the

motion

to

plaintiff

had

filed her

designation of witnesses and exhibits.
4.
commencement

On

March

3,

1992,

of the above-captioned

immediately

prior

to

the

trial, the Court granted

defendant's motion to apportion fault of Salt Lake City.
5.

Thereafter, defendant's counsel argued to the jury

in opening statement that the party most responsible for causing
this accident is Salt Lake City due to an obstruction of the stop
sign by trees.
6.

Because of the Court's ruling allowing Salt Lake

City to be added to the special verdict on the first day of trial
and based upon the strong and primary attack which the defendant is
presenting against Salt Lake City, affiant has sought to find and
has now located a previously unknown and unidentified witness
critical to the presentation of plaintiff's case.
7.

Upon the conclusion of the first day of trial, at

6:20 p.m. on March 3, 1992, affiant was able to contact said new
witness, Jim Makling, for the first time.
8.

Mr. Makling resides at 122 North Canyon Road in Salt

Lake City and is willing and able to testify at trial.

C:\JEH\PLEADING\TURNER.APF
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9.

Mr. Makling has resided at 122 North Canyon Road, in

the immediate vicinity of the stop sign at issue in this lawsuit,
for the past ten years.
10.

Mr. Makling will testify that the stop sign has not

been obstructed by trees or foliage during the past ten years and
was not obstructed by trees or other foliage at the time of this
accident.
11.

Furthermore, Mr. Makling will testify that there has

never been a need for and there has never been a trimming of the
trees to eliminate obstruction of the subject stop sign.
12.

Accordingly, affiant submits that Mr. Makling is a

material and critical witness for the plaintiff in the abovereferenced matter.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
DATED this 4th day of[Maroh( 1992.

E. Hansen
On

this

4th

day Iy6t

March,

1992,

before

me,

the

undersigned notary, personally appeared John E. Hansen, who is
personally known to me to be the person who signed the preceding
document in my presence and who affirmed to me that the signature
is voluntary and the document truthful.
Notary Public '
C:\JEH\PLEADING\TURNER.AFF
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mer (1985, 4th D m ) 136 111 App
3d 468. 91 III Dec 365. 483 Nh2d
711 (disagreed with on other
grounds Chambers v Rush-Presbytertan St Luke's Medical Center
(1st Dist) 133 III App 3d 458. 508
NE2d 426). noted that a defendant
had contended that the witness*
testimony became necessary due to
the plaintiff* s strategy in cross-examining other defense witnesses
Staling that it did not approve ol
the complete lack of notice, the
court nevertheless afhimcd judgment on a jury verdict in favor of
the defendants.

§ 10. Lack of apparent need for
witness
In the* following cases, the courts
held or %tated that it was proper to
allow or improper to exclude the
testimony ol an undisclosed witness, where the calling party's need
for the witness' testimony had not
previously been apparent
In Darwin v Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid transit Authority (1981) 158
Ga App 635, 281 Sr.2d 3 6 1 . the
c 4»uit. discussing the admissibility
ol the- ic-stunom ol a witness who
had not been disc losed in a pretrial
cndei. slated that it would never
<mi.nl a parts * light to produce in
its behall witnesses whose necessity
or perhaps existence was only
lately readied
rinding that the trial court in a
wronglul death action had not
abused its discretion in allowing
the defense to call an undisclosed
witness, the court in Curry v Sum-

one of the automobiles involved in
the accident had been sold by the
defendant manufacturer to the defendant dealer, and that the witness had been able to identify the
vehicle based on an accident report
whu h he had prepared while acting
as an insurance adjuster I "he witness' name had not been listed in
the pretrial summary, nor was it
submitted to opposing counsel
within the 45-day period allowed
under
the pretrial order
for
amending the witness list

Rejecting the contention that the
tnal court in an action for breach
In Huhn v Marshall Exploration. of an emptovtnent contract should
Inc. (1976. La App 2d O r ) 337 So have granted a new trial because of
2d 5 6 1 . 55 O C R 454. cert den ( U ) the plaintiffs failure to comply
339 So 2d 854. an action seeking fully with discovery requests calling
cancellation of an oil and gas lease, for the identification of witnesses,
the court found no abuse of discre- the couit in rarret! v Auto Club of
tion in the trial court's having al- Michigan (1986) 155 Mich App
lowed the testimony of dn undis- 378. 399 NW2d 531. I BNA ILR
closed defense witness, where the Cas 1437. held that the trial court
witness was < ailed because the tes- had not abused its discretion in
timony of other defense witnesses accepting as true the plaintiff's exhad been excluded on hearsay planation that he had not identified
grounds Itie excluded testimony a witness during discovery because
concerned vandalism which caused he had not expected to rely on the
the defendant not to be able to witness* testimony until shortly bemarket gas during a 4-month pe- fore trial I lie court also noted
riod, while the unlisted witness. Af\ that the plaintiff disclosed the witemployee of the defendant, was in ness 10 d.i\< belore trial and
the field and periodicallv observed agreed to allow an interview of the
witness prior to the commencethe effect of the vandalism
ment ol the trial
I he couit in Nuhol v hi l\ir
Motoi Sales (1973) 4r> Mich App
426. 206 NVVid I'M), holding ihat
the trial |udge in an action arising
from an automobile accident was
justified in allowing the testimony
of a witness for the plaintiff, explained that the plaintiff had been
unable to obtain records from the
owner of the automobile, his employer, which would establish that
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whether it was poor, rich or nondescript;
and incidentally, there is no such thing as
"jail clothes" in the sense of being in a
uniform or having distinctive markings so
indicating.3 In any event, that sole fact
would have revealed nothing new to the
jury, certainly nothing concerning his guilt
or innocence. They could not have failed to
be aware that a man charged with armed
robbery was in custody and being held in
jail. Indeed, that fact was brought out in
the evidence. Moreover, there is no basis
other than the merest conjecture as to
whether whatever type of clothing the petitioner was wearing would inspire sympathy
for, or prejudice against, the petitioner, or
would have any effect on the jury's determination of his guilt or innocence.
In the interest of giving effect to legal
procedures and the solidarity of judgments
once fairly arrived at, it is our settled law
that in order to justify reversing a conviction, it is essential that it be made to appear
both that an error was committed and that
it was prejudicial in that there is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome
of the trial.4

which should long since have been at rest,
combine, in my mind, to make a convincing
case for supporting the judgment of the
trial court.
This petitioner has had not only all of the
protections the law allows, including the
jury trial, assisted by competent counsel,
but he was also given a full and fair opportunity in this habeas corpus proceeding to
present any evidence to persuade a different, fair and conscientious district judge
that he has suffered an injustice. Having
failed in both of those trials, the majority
opinion directs that this proceeding be further proliferated. That is the prerogative
of this Court to which I owe such deference
as is appropriate. But it is equally my
prerogative and responsibility to express
my disagreement therewith and my judgment that there should be no such further
proceedings. I would affirm and approve
the judgments already entered herein.
HALL, J., concurs in the opinion of
CROCKETT, C. J.

In summary, there are several propositions, each of which should prevent the
reversal of the judgment:
First, the absence of any credible basis in
the evidence to show that the petitioner
wore so-called jail clothing, or that there
was any prejudice which resulted therefrom.
Second, failure to can attention to the
matter either at the time of the original
trial, or at the time of sentence, or on
appeal.
Third, there are the presumptions of regularity and verity of the original trial and
the judgment which has not been accorded.
Fourth, the same statement applies as to
this proceeding and the affirmative duty to
show prejudicial error.

The BOARD OF EDUCATION of SOUTH
SANPETE SCHOOL DISTRICT. Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Donald K. BARTON and Utah Farm
Production Credit Assn., Defendants
and Appellant
No. 15946.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 28, 1980.

Fifth, all of those, together with the toolong delayed complaint about matters

Landowner appealed from judgment
entered by the District Court, Sanpete

3. This case is similar to State v Archuletta. 28
Ut.ih 2d 255. 501 P 2d 263 (1972)

4. This is the express mandate of Section 77
42 1. U C A 1953 See e g . State v Neai. 1
Utah 2d 122. 161 P 2d 756 (1953)
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County, Don V. Tibbs, J.t on jury verdict in
eminent domain proceeding. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) fact that
complaint had stated that the value of land
was higher than amount awarded by the
jury did not show that the damages were
insufficient where the complaint referred to
the value of land and water rights and the
judgment referred only to the land, but (2)
landowner should ho™ K~»n p o r n ^ y H

tn

elicit, from expert witness whom he wished
tO Call, fact that the expert HaH nriflnnally

been hired by the condemning authority to
make an appraisal of the property.
Reversed and remanded.
Crockett, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion.
1. Eminent Domain <*=»241
Where school district's complaint in
eminent domain proceeding stated that value of the property was $48,980 but that
figure included both land and water rights
and trial court correctly ruled that water
rights were not to be taken, the allegation
in the complaint did not preclude an award
of only $40,000 for the tract
2. Eminent Domain <*» 191(1)
Landowner was entitled to the value of
his land as fixed by the jury, based upon
the evidence, and not necessarily the
amount stated in the pleadings of either
party in the eminent domain proceeding.
3. Evidence <*=> 142(1)
In eminent domain proceeding involving 24.49 acres, trial court properly excluded, as not being a-cemparable sale, evidence
of the sale of an acre of land to a church for
$10,000 where the testimony indicated that
transaction actually involved more than one
acre and that the seller was to give the
church some adjoining property as part of
the deal.
4. TriaJ **$2(1)
"Rphn^l PvirUnce" is that which tends
to refuteTor to so modify or explain as to
nullify or minimize the effect of, the opponent's evidence..
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

5. Pretrial Procedure *»753
Where defense witness gave testimony
about an allegedly comparable sale which
could have been regarded a* requiring explanation it was proper and consistent with
pretrial order limiting the parties to the
witnesses nawwrf therein except for rebuttal

witnesses to allow testimony from another
witness concerning that transaction.
6. Evidence «»543<3)
Landowner should have been permitted
to call, as witness to give opinion as to the
value of the land, a person who had originally been hired by the condemning authority to appraise the land and to elicit testimony to the effect that he had been employed by the condemning authority for
that purpose.
7. Witnesses *=>319, 330(1), 331%
Attack on credibility of a party's witness may be conducted by the other party
either by his own cross-examination of the
witness or by calling other witnesses to
accomplish that purpose.
8. Evidence *»560
Where testimony of one expert whom
landowner wished to call would have set the
value of the property below that testified to
by his other experts, trial court ruling that
he could not elicit from the witness the fact
that the witness had originally been hired
by the condemning authority to make an
appraisal of the land effectively precluded
the defendant from calling that witness, as
his testimony without the explanation
would have been harmful.

Paul R. Frischkneckt, Manti, for Farm
Production Credit Ass'n.
Arthur H. Neilsen and Clark R. Nielsen
Of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson & Peck,
Salt Lake City, for Barton.
Bruce Findlay and Dan S. Bushnell of
Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent
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STEWART, Justice:
Defendant Donald K. Barton appeals,
complaining of the inadequacy of a jury
award of $40,000 for his 24.49 acre tract of
land in Manti taken by eminent domain by
the plaintiff.

Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11,395 P.2d
25 (1964). Since the testimony Mr. Palmer
had given about th* <?M t r » w w t i n n ™"lH
have been regarded as requiring explanation, it was qijite proper *n<\ consistent with
the just-stated definition to consider Wilbur
Cox's testimony as rebuttal. See Jenson v.
S.H. Kiw&Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 ?2A 958
(1935). It is also pertinent to note that the
defendant cross-examined Wilbur Cox
about the matter without showing any significant difference from the other evidence.
We are unable to perceive how the trial
court's rulings, or what was said with respect to the Cox sale, resulted in any prejudice to the defendant

[1,2] The defendant's first argument in
support of his contention that insufficient
damages were awarded for his property is
that the plaintiffs complaint itself had
stated the value to be $48,980. The rejoinder to this is that that figure included both
the land and water rights. The trial court
correctly ruled that the water rights were
not to be taken. Plaintiffs appraiser testified that the defendant's property would be
Defendant also assigns error in the trial
worth substantially loss without the water court's ruling concerning Dee Ogden, who
rights. Accordingly, the $40,000 awarded had made an appraisal at the instance of
could reasonably be found to be supported the plaintiff. Pursuant to a discussion of
by the expert testimony as to the value of this matter in the absence of the jury,
the land. Nevertheless, what the defend- plaintiff requested the court to rule that
ant was entitled to was the value of his the defendant could not elicit before the
land as fixed by the jury, based upon the jury the fact that Ogden had been emevidence, and not necessarily as stated in ployed by the plaintiff Board of Education.
the pleadings of either party.
The plaintiffs motion was
[t]o prevent Mr. Ogden from, in any way,
[3] Defendant further urges that the
testifying or the defendant landowner
trial court committed error which influfrom asking the witness that his appraisenced the jury in not awarding greater
al
was made for the School Board, or that
damages in its rulings concerning testimony
Mr.
Ogden was paid a fee . . . .
about the sale of an acre of land in Manti to
The
trial
court explained its ruling as folthe L.D.S. ("Mormon") Church for $10,000
by one Grant Cox. The trial court's state- lows:
The motion is granted and it looks to me
ment that it was not a comparable sale is
like it would not be proper and I think I
apparently correct The testimony of the
would be committing prejudicial error to
defendant's appraiser, Marcellus Palmer,
allow, this to go in. You can call him for
and the plaintiffs witness, Wilbur Cox, inan appraisal but not to give testimony
dicated that the transaction involved more
than one acre and that Grant Cox was to
that he was employed by the School Disgive the church some adjoining property as
trict or make any reference to the School
part of the deal.
District's paying him so you may get his
appraisal, but that's the limit of it, Mr.
[4,5] Defendant also complains about
Ogden.
permitting Wilbur Cox to be called as a
[6] The trial court erred in ruling that
witness concerning this transaction. He asthe
defendant could call Ogden to give his
serts that it had been agreed, and the court
appraisal
of the condemned land but could
included in its pre-trial order, that the only
not
be
questioned
as to the fact that he was
witnesses to be called were those named
employed
by
the
school
district That testitherein, except for rebuttal. Rebuttal evimony
went
to
the
heart
of the issue at trial.
dence is that which tends to reTutq, or to so
modify or explainf as to nullify or minimize
Defendant's purpose was to elicit testimothe effect of the opponent's evidence. See ny concerning the value of the property,

0152

350

Utah

617 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

which it may be assumed was greater than
what plaintiff's witnesses had testified to.
It was, of course, directly probative of the
central issue in the case. But equally important, defendant had strong reason and a
legal right to ask Ogden the identity of his
employer. That testimony, with the likelihood of greater objectivity, would have
served to rebut the valuation testimony of
plaintiffs expert witnesses. To deny the
defendant that nght is to deny him a fair
trial. The jury was entitled to know the
essential background facts of the witness so
as to be able to give proper weight to his
testimony.

Experts": A New Approach to an Old
Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 Neb.L.
Rev. 539 (1965); McCoid. Opinion Evidence
and Expert Witnesses, 2 U.C.LA.LRev. 356
(1955); DeParcq, Law, Science and the Expert Witness, 24 TennJLRev. 166 (1956).

Expert witnesses, like other witnesses,
are influenced by unconscious, and some*
times conscious, biases. The problem of the
expert witness's bias has been commented
on by Dean Wigmore:
That bias itself is due, partly to the special fee which has been paid or promised
him, and partly to his prior consultation
with the party and his selfcommittal to a
The term "expert testimony" connotes a
particular view. His candid scientific
degree of objectivity imposed by the disciopinion thus has had no fair opportunity
pline and training of the expert But valuof expression, or even of formation,
ation testimony as to property in a condemswerved as he is by this partisan commitnation proceeding sometimes falls short of
tal
[2 Wigmore on Evidence § 563
that objective, partly because of the numerat 761 (Chadboum rev. 1979).]
ous subjective and variable values, and
Defendant clearly was entitled to the testherefore may differ sharply from the testitimony which the prohibited questions
mony of another expert witness. Experts'
would have elicited, simply because it may
opinions, especiaify in the area of valuation
well have been less likely to be biased than
of property, often vary so widely that one
any of the other experts called by the parmay wonder whether they are valuing the
ties. This is especially true in this case
same parcel of land.
because the valuation of plaintiffs and deThe court in this case prevented inquiry fendant's experts were poles apart. Ogas to the identity of the employer of an den's appraisal was made under the diexpert witness. The jury could not, there- rection of the party adverse to the party
fore, evaluate the process by which plaintiff who sought to adduce Ogden's testimony
chose his exj>erts nor determine the appro- and thus carried a mark of objectivity that
priate weight to be afforded the testimony may not have been commanded by the other
of the witnesses for the respective parties. experts.
The defendant had a right to bring to the
jury's attention the fact that a witness had
been initially enlisted by plaintiff and pursuant to that employment had acquired his
knowledge and formed his opinion as to the
property's value. The circumstances by
which Ogden became aware of the facts
needed to form his opinion provided the
necessary foundation for the jury to weigh
the valuation testimony. More importantly, his employment bore directly on the
all-important issue of his objectivity or bias.
This information was essential, especially in
light of the highly disparate views of the
same facts that may be arrived at by different experts. See Myers, "Battle of the

[7] The defendant did not propose to
call Ogden simply to impeach him. The
questions prohibited by the trial court could
not possibly have resulted in impeaching
the witness; indeed, they would have given
weight and substance to his testimony. If
the proffered testimony would have discredited anyone's testimony, it would have
been the testimony offered by plaintiffs
witnesses. It is axiomatic that an attack on
the credibility of a party's witnesses may be
conducted by the other party either by his
own cross-examination of the witnesses or
by calling other witnesses to accomplish
that purpose. Haver v. Central Railroad
Co., 64 NJ.L. 312, 45 A. 593 (1900). More
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You can call him for an appraisal, but not
to give testimony that he was employed
by the school district [Emphasis added.]

importantly, the testimony, because of its
direct relevance as to value, went well beyond impeachment evidence.
[8] Before Ogden was permitted to testify, plaintiffs counsel interrupted by approaching the bench for a discussion and
made the motion above referred to to prevent the testimony of the witness. The
court responded by an order which precluded defendant's obtaining the testimony regarding the witness's employment by the
school district or any reference to the school
district's paying him to make an appraisal.
Having been denied the right to examine
the witness properly and to adduce the evidence of employment, the defendant cannot
be faulted for not having called the witness
to testify solely as to the amount of his
appraisal. Such testimony, no doubt, would
have been lower than the amounts testified
to by defendant's other experts and therefore without the necessary information as
to the witness's background, damaging to
defendant's case. Accordingly, the defendant was effectively precluded from calling
Ogden under the restriction imposed.
Because of that error which appears to us
as substantial and prejudicial, it is necessary that the judgment be reversed and the
case remanded. No costs awarded.
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ.,
concur.

In regard to the charge of error, I make
several observations. The first is that I
offer no defense of any notion that an
expert cannot be asked who hired him. It
is to be conceded that such a witness may
be examined as to who employed him, and
who is paying him, as having a possible
bearing upon his motivation and his credibility.1 Nor is it to be doubted that a trial
court should be quite liberal in allowing any
competent evidence offered by a party to
prove his case.
In regard to the evidence in question, it is
my impression from the record that the
trial court simply rejected the idea that Mr.
Ogden could be called solely for the purpose
of showing that he had been hired by the
plaintiff School Board to make an appraisal
and that the Board then failed to call him
as its witness. It is significant to note that
defendant's counsel did not pursue the matter and make plain to the trial court what
he was proposing; and that he did not in
any manner indicate what Mr. Ogden's testimony would be.2 Therefore, any question
as to the latter's credibility was never
placed in issue; and more importantly,
there is no basis upon which to determine
whether the trial court's statement had any
prejudicial effect upon the defendant's case

CROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I am in agreement with the main opinion,
except as to the manner In which it deals
with the trial court's handling of the matter
relating to possible testimony of Mr. Dee
Ogden. He appears to have made an appraisal at the instance of the plaintiff, but
was not called as a witness. Pursuant to a
discussion of the matter in the absence of
the jury, plaintiff requested the court to
rule that defendant could not elicit that
fact before the jury. As will be noted in
the statement quoted in the main opinion,
the court told defendant's counsel:

I think the trial court was justified in its
view that each side had a full and fair
opportunity to present its evidence, including that the experts for each side had sufficiently presented their respective views as
to value to the jury to enable it to make a
fair determination on that issue. When
that procedure has been accomplished, and
the trial judge has also placed his stamp of
approval upon the verdict by denying the
motion for a new trial, this Court on review
should indulge the verdict and the judgment with the presumptions of verity; and

1.

2.

See 31 A m . J u r 2 d , Expert and O p i n i o n Evidence, $ 50, a n d authorities cited tn the main
opinion

That a proponent of evidence must make
some such offer or indication of the substance
of evidence, see Rule 5. Utah Rules of Evidence
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should not disturb it unless it is shown that
there is substantial error in whose absence
there is a reasonable likelihood that there
would have been a different result,5
Upon the basis of the record, I am not
persuaded that there was any such error or
unfairness as to justify upsetting the verdict and judgment.

O I Kf THUMBS SYSTEM}

Velma Gladys YATES, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER, a
Project of the Division of Family and
Community Medicine, University of
Utah; Uintah County; Uintah County
Hospital; Vernal Drug Company, a Utah
corporation; Gordon Lee Balka, M. D.,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 16602.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 29, 1980.
Appeal was taken from order of the
Fourth District Court, Unitah County, Allen B. Sorenson, J., dismissing medical malpractice complaint filed against health center, county; county hospital, drug company,
and physician. The Supreme Court, Wilkins,.J., held that: (1) trial court did not err
in dismissing medical malpractice complaint
against health center, drug company, and
physician, in that plaintiff failed to serve
proper notice of intent to commence action
prior to* filing complaint; (2) plaintiff had
one year to file another medical malpractice
complaint against drug company, health
center, and physician; and (3) trial court
did not err in dismissing with prejudice
medical malpractice complaint against

county and county hospital, in that plaintiff
failed to serve proper notice of intent to
commence action prior to filing complaint,
and failed to give notice required by Governmental Immunity Act and statute governing actions against county.
Affirmed.
1. Drugs and Narcotics <fc»20
Hospitals <fc»8
Physicians and Surgeons <s=»l&20
Trial court did not err in dismissing
medical malpractice complaint against
health center, drug company, and physician,
in that plaintiff failed to serve proper notice of intent to commence action prior to
filing complaint U.C.A.1953,78-14-8.
2. Limitation of Actions «=* 130(1)
Even though plaintiff failed to serve
proper notice on health center, drug company, and physician of intent to commence
action prior to filing medical malpractice
complaint, failure to serve notice did not
constitute adjudication on merits; thus,
plaintiff had one year from filing of opinion
in which to file another complaint U.C.A.
1953,78-12-40,78-14-8.
3. Counties <s=»212
Trial court did not err in dismissing
with prejudice medical malpractice complaint against county and county hospital,
in that plaintiff failed to serve proper notice of intent to commence action prior to
filing complaint and failed to give notice
required by Governmental Immunity Act
and statute governing claims against county. U.C.A.1953, 17-15-10, 63-30-13, 7814-8.
4. Statutes <s=»85<l)
Statute requiring notice to health care
provider of intent to commence malpractice
action was not unconstitutional special legislation. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-8.
Robert M. McRae of McRae & DeLand,
Vernal, for plaintiff and appellant

X See Rule 61. U.R.C.P.; Ed^er w Willis. 17
Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003 (1966).

0155

Utah 515

STATE v. ALBRETSEN
Cite M 782 T2& SIS (Utah 1989)

operations. However, this examination
came much too late to save the depositors'
money.
Section 63-30-10(4) (1978) (amended 1982
& 1985), which provides that immunity is
not waived for injury that arises out of a
failure to make an inspection or by reason
of making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, presents no problem here. By the very language of subsection (4), it is inapplicable here since there is
no complaint of negligent inspection of
property. The cases which we have decided under subsection (4) confirm that it pertains to inspection of tangible property. In
Velasquez v. Union Pacific R.R., 24 Utah
2d 217, 218-19, 469 P.2d 5, 6 (1970), the
plaintiff complained that the defendant, the
Utah Public Service Commission, had not
established a program to discover dilapidated railroad crossing signs and to replace them. In White v. State, 579 P.2d
921, 923 (Utah 1978), the plaintiff, who was
injured while working with machinery in a
vegetable cannery, contended that the defendant was aware, or should have been
aware, of several violations of the safety
regulations of the Utah Occupational
Health and Safety Act by inspection. In
the instant case, the plaintiff does not complain of the Department's failure,to make
an inspection of tangible property but of
the Department's failure to examine and
supervise West America Credit. I do not
believe that the legislative intent in subsection (4) was to categorize financial examinations and supervision as "inspections of
property/' Therefore, subsection (4) does
not confer any immunity upon'the Department in this action.
I would reverse the summary judgment
granted the Department and remand the
case to the trial court for a determination
of the statutory duty of the Department in
this case and the other issues.
STEWART, J., concurs in the
dissenting opinion of HOWE, Associate
CJ.
(O

|KfYMUM«RSYSUM>

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee.
v.
Douglas R. ALBRETSEN. Defendant
and Appellant
No. 880154.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 25, 1989.

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond
S. Uno, J., of aggravated burglary and
theft, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court, Howe, Associate CJ., held that* (1)
probative value of mug shot* for purposes
of corroborating identification of defendant
outweighed any prejudice caused by suggestion of prior criminal activity, and (2)
trial court acted within its discretion in
allowing testimony of rebuttal witness to
impeach defendant's alibi evidence, even
though prosecutor did not notify dpfondant

prior to trial.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law e»438(3)
Probative value of mug shots to corroborate victim's identification of her attacker outweighed any prejudice which
might have been caused by mug shots creating suggestion of prior criminal activity.
Rules of Evid., Rules 403, 404(b).
«
2. Criminal Law <S=>1168(2)
Taping over, rather than cutting off,
booking references at bottom of mug shots
used to corroborate victim's identification
of defendant, was not prejudicial error; defendant was additionally identified by victim from six-picture photo display and in
lineup. Rules of Evid., Rules 403, 404(b).
3. Criminal Law <£»629.5(5)
Trial court acted within its discretion
in allowing rebuttal witness to testify, even
though prosecuting attorney did not notify
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defendant before trial that witness would
testify to contradict and impeach defendant's alibi evidence; evidentiary development occurred in course of trial, prosecutor
acted in flood faith and defgngft qfl»"«£l
was told of possible rebuttal testimony as
soon as need was discovered. U.C.A.1953,
77-14-2(1, 4).
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra L Sjogren,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Defendant Douglas R. Albretsen appeals
from convictions of aggravated burglary, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1978), and theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).
On May 11, 1987, Maureen Leavitt returned home from work at approximately
5:30 to 5:45 p.m. After entering her house,
she walked down the hall leading from the
family room to the kitchen. As she approached the end of the hallway, a man
with a club raised in his hand suddenly
stepped in front of her; he was approximately two feet away. They looked at
each other for approximately three seconds
before he started beating her with the club,
leaving her unconscious. She suffered extensive injuries and was hospitalized for
two days.
On' May 14, 1987, Leavitt identified defendant as her attacker from a black looseleaf binder containing 30 to 50 mug shots
given her by Detective Hutchison. Upon
making this identification, she stated to her
husband, "This looks like the man that beat
me." The next day, Detective Hutchison
showed Leavitt a display of six photos
mounted on a piece of cardboard. She
again selected the photograph of defendant After defendant's arrest, Leavitt attended a lineup where she again identified
him as her assailant
Several months prior to trial, defendant
filed a notice of intent to rely on the defense of alibi, as required by Utah Code

Ann. § 77-14-2(1) (1982). He listed Brenda
Davis and Cindy Edwards as alibi witnesses. The State filed its reply to the notice,
listing Detective Hutchison as a rebuttal
witness.
At the trial, the prosecutor moved for
admission of the six-picture photo display,
as well as the mug shots of defendant
which he had removed from the black binder and had altered by masking the booking
references which appeared at the bottom.
Defendant did not object to the admission
of the photo display, and it was admitted.
However, he did object to the mug shots on
the ground that they were inherently prejudicial and because of the masking, which he
argued would raise the jury's curiosity and
suspicion. The court overruled the objection and admitted the mug shots to show
one source of Leavitt's identification. On
cross-examination, defendant's counsel had
Leavitt repeat that when she identified defendant from the loose-leaf binder, she told
her husband: 'This looks like the man that
beat me." Then, defense counsel questioned Leavitt about her identifications of
the photographs.
Several months prior to trial, Detective
Hutchison obtained a handwritten statement from Brenda Davis in which she
claimed that defendant was with her at the
time of the crime. Davis wrote that they
had "gone up into the mountains for a ride,
into Parley's Way and Emigration Canyon." At the trial, however, she testified
in detail as to the route taken on the ride.
After the defense rested, the prosecution
informed the court that he anticipated
some rebuttal and requested a recess in
order to locate a Mr. Miller from the Utah
Department of Transportation, who he believed would testify that the route claimed
to have been taken by defendant and Brenda Davis was closed to traffic on May 11,
1987. Defense counsel objected to the recess and moved that evidence be closed at
that time. The court denied the motion,
and Mr. Miller was later allowed to testify
over defendant's objection.
I
Defendant first contends that the trial
court committed prejudicial error in admit-
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ting mug shots of him. He argues that defendant from police photographs or
they suggested prior criminal activity, "mug shots" as the person for whom a
which suggestion was exacerbated by the money order had been cashed was held
masking of the booking reference. He re- admissible on issue of identification. State
lies upon rules 403 and 404(b), Utah Rules v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123, 388 P.2d 797
of Evidence.
(Utah 1964). Similarly, in State v. Jiron,
Zl
Utah 2d 21, 22, 492 P.2d 983, 984 (Utah
Although this Court has never deter1972),
this Court decided that "evidence of
mined whether mug shots are admissible to
an
extra-judicial
identification is admissible,
corroborate identification testimony, rule
not
only
to
corroborate
an identification
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
made
at
the
trial
[citation],
but as indepenstates:
dent
evidence
of
identity."
(Quoting PeoEvidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
ple
v.
Gould,
54
Cal.2d
621,
626, 354 P.2d
is not admissible to prove the character
865,
867,
7
Cal.Rptr.
273,
275
(I960).)
of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may,
During the trial, defendant argued that
however, be admissible for other pur- Leavitt had "difficulties with identificaposes, such as proof of motive, opportu- tion" based on her statement, "This looks
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl- like the man that beat me." Thus, the mug
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or shots were valuable in showing that while
they were somewhat outdated, they neveraccident.
(Italics added.) However, even if evidence theless were identifiable likenesses of deof prior wrongdoing is admissible under fendant The jury was not equipped to
that rule, such evidence may be excluded decide whether Leavitt's identification was
faulty without viewing the mug shots she
under rule 403, which states:
Although relevant, evidence may be ex- used to identify him. The jury as the trier
cluded if its probative value is substan- of fact had the duty of determining from
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair the proof presented, which in this case inprejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis- cluded the mug shots, whether Leavitt's
leading the jury, or by considerations of identification was reliable.
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
A Michigan court correctly observed in a
presentation of cumulative evidence.
similar case:
Thus, if the probative value of the evidence
[I]t would be better if the jury was not
is not substantially outweighed by the danallowed to see mug shots of the defenger of prejudice, the scales are tipped in
dant However, where, as here, defense
favor of admission.
counsel has made an issue of the witness's ability to recognize the defendant
[1] In the instant case, the lower court
from
the picture he was shown by the
correctly ruled that the mug shots were*
police,
it was not improper for the trial
admissible for purposes of establishing
court
to
admit the photos.
identity. Even though we Recognize that
under rule 403, they could still be excluded, People v. Trainer, 39 Mich.App. 398, 402,
the mug shots here were crucial in estab- 197 N.W.2d 890, 892 (1972).
lishing the identity of defendant, which
[2] We next address whether the procewas the main issue. They were the initial dures used by the trial court to minimize
source of Leavitt's identification, and they any possible prejudicial effect of the mug
explained her reaction when she identified shots were proper and effective, i.e., taping
him as her attacker. Also, admitting the over the booking references. Although the
mug shots served to rebut defendant's the- State had a demonstrable need to introduce
ory that later identifications by her were the mug shots to establish identity, the
connected to the mug shots rather than to trial court nevertheless erred in not cutting
the attacker.
off the reference at the bottom. When
In a similar case, the testimony of a suggestive material is masked, the curimanager of a store that he recognized the osity of the jury is increased. Trial courts
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should employ safeguards to disguise the
origin of police photographs, including the
removal of police identification numbers,
United States v. Watts, 532 F.2d 1215,
1217 (8th Cir.), cert denied 429 U.S. 847,
97 S.Ct 131, 50 LEd.2d 119 (1976), and
separating the combined profile and frontal
views characteristic of mug shots. Id
Since Leavitt additionally identified defendant from the six-picture photo display as
well as in a lineup, we do not find the error
to have been prejudicial to defendant
II
[3] Defendant next assails the trial
court's failure to sustain his objection to
the admission of testimony by the State's
rebuttal witness, Richard L. Miller, which
admission defendant asserts violated Utah
Code Ann. § 77-14-2 and denied him due
process. That section provides:
77-14-2. Alibi—Notice requirements—
Witness lists. (1) A defendant, whether
or not written demand has been made,
who intends to offer evidence of an alibi
shall, not less than ten days before trial
or at such other time as the court may
allow, file and serve on the prosecuting
attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The notice shall contain specific information as to the place
where the defendant claims to have been
at the time of the alleged offense and, as
particularly as is known to the defendant
or his attorney, the names and addresses
of the witnesses by whom he proposes to
establish alibi. The prosecuting attorney, not more than five days after receipt of the list provided herein or at
such other time as the court may direct,
shall file and serve the defendant with
the addresses, as particularly as are
known to him, of the witnesses the state
proposes to offer to contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi evidence.
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be under a continuing duty
to disclose the names and addresses of
additional witnesses which come to the
attention of either party after filing their
alibi witness lists.

(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply with the requirements of this section, the court may exclude evidence offered to establish or
rebut alibi. However, the defendant
may always testify on his own behalf
concerning alibi.
(4) The court may, for good cau#
shown, waive the requirements of this
section.
In her handwritten statement given the
police, Brenda Davis stated that she and
defendant had, on the day of the crane,
"gone up into the mountains for a ride into
Parley's Way and Emigration Canyon"
However, when she testified at the trial,
she described the exact route they too*,
stating that they drove up Parley's Canyon
(not Parley's Way, which is a different
street), took the turnoff to East Canyon
and followed that highway to the turnoff to
Emigration Canyon and then came dovtn
Emigration Canyon, which brought them
back to Salt Lake City. Miller, an engineer
for the Utah Department of Transportation, testified, over defendant's objection,
that from April 13 to June 17, 1987, SRH»,
the highway which Davis claimed that they
took linking Parley's Canyon and Emigra
tion Canyon, was closed to traffic
Defendant asserts that the trial court
should not have allowed Mr. Miller to testify since the prosecuting attorney did not
notify defendant prior to trial of its intent
to have Miller testify to contradict anJ
impeach defendant's alibi evidence, as required by section 77-14-2(1). We find no
error in view of the fact that the Suit
could not have reasonably anticipated the
discrepancy between Davis's handwritten
statement and her later testimony at tna!
Inasmuch as there was a significani
change in the route claimed to have beet
taken, the trial court reasonably alio**:
the prosecution to add to its rebuttal Ibt
when this evidentiary development oc
curred in the course of trial. The tnJ
court acted within the discretion accords
by section 77-14-2(4), which provides, "The
court may, for good cause shown, waiw
the requirements of this section." Tht
prosecutor acted in good faith when hi
apprised defense counsel of the possibii
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rebuttal testimony an floo* ?e 1>c ™»H wnc
discovered. The Montana Supreme Court,
in State v. Madera, 206 Mont 140, 670 P.2d
552, 556 (1983), held that discretion should
be given to "the District Court to permit
additions to the witness list when good
cause is shown; flood cause must certainly
be construed to include the amendment of
the.witness list because of evidentiary matters developed during the presentation of
the case of either party, matters which
require clarification or rebuttal by that par-

of individual's claims that he was not taxpayer and that Commission's assessment
and actions in regard thereto were invalid;
and (3) excessive scope of subpoena did not
provide individual good cause for failing to
appear and provide information relating to
availability of assets to satisfy tax assessment, so individual was appropriately held
in contempt
Writ of mandate vacated; contempt citation affirmed.
Stewart, J.t concurred in result.

Defendant's convictions are affirmed.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

STATE TAX COMMISSION of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Clay K. IVERSON, Defendant
and Appellant.
Nos. 20965, 860329.
Supreme Court oi Utah.
Nov. 2, 1989.

On State Tax Commission's applications, the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., Issued writ of
mandate compelling individual to file income tax returns and adjudged individual
in contempt of court for failing to comply
with subpoena duces tecum issued by the
Commission. Individual appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that (1) evidence would not support granting of writ
of mandate compelling filing of tax returns; (2) individual's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies with respect to notice of deficiency precluded consideration

1. Taxation <*=»1083
Evidence did not support granting of
petition for writ of mandate to compel individual to file income tax return; individual
specifically denied that he received "income" for the time in question and stated
that to the best of his knowledge he had no
filing requirement as to federal taxes,
much of the exchange considered by court
in making decision centered on unsworn
statements regarding past conversations
between the individual and counsel for
State Tax Commission that the individual
testified he could not recall, and there was
no support for court's taking judicial notice
that the individual's services could be
equated to federal minimum wage levels.
U.C.A.I953, 59-14A-71, 59-31-7 (now U.C.
A.1953, 5S-10-525, 59-1-707).
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
*=>229
Generally, parties must exhaust applicable administrative remedies as prerequisite to seeking judicial review.
3. Administrative Law and Procedure
*=»229
Exceptions to rule that parties must
generally exhaust applicable administrative
remedies as prerequisite to seeking judicial
review exist in unusual circumstances in
which it appears that there is likelihood
that some oppression or injustice is occurring so that it would be unconscionable not
to review alleged grievance or when it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose.
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EXHIBIT G
SPECIAL VERDICT (R 288 - 291)
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Third Judicial District
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JULIE ANDERSON TURNER,
Plaintiff,

*
*
*

SPECIAL VERDICT

it

vs.
AMY NELSON,
Defendant.

*
*
*

Civil No. C91-1901

•

Judge Frederick

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a
preponderance of the evidence.

If you find the evidence

preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes.11
you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer
"No."

Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence.

If

1.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do

you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant,
Amy Nelson, was negligent as alleged by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:
2.

Yes

No

If you answered Question No. 1 as "yes", answer

this question.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do

you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence
of the defendant, Amy Nelson, was either the sole proximate cause
or a contributing proximate case of the injuries of Julie Turner?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

If you answered either question No. 1 or Question No. 2 as "no",
do not answer the remaining questions.
3.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do

you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Salt Lake City
was negligent alleged by the defendant?
ANSWER:
4.
this question.

Yes

No

If you answered Question No. 3 as "yes", answer
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do

you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence
of Salt Lake City was either the sole proximate cause or a
contributing proximate cause of the injuries of Julie Turner?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

2

5.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do

you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff,
Julie Turner, was negligent as alleged by the defendants?
ANSWER:
6.
this question.

Yes

No

If you answered Question No. 5 as "yesM, answer
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do

you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence
of the plaintiff, Julie Turner, was either the sole proximate
cause or a contributing proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries?
ANSWER:
7.

Yes

No

If you have answered either Question 4 or 6 or

both of them as "Yes," then, and only then, answer the following
question:

Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to

total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable
to:
A.

Defendant, Amy Nelson

%

B.

Salt Lake City

%

C.

Plaintiff, Julie Turner

%

TOTAL

8.

100%

State the amount of special and general damages,

if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the
injuries complained of.
3

Medical Special Damages

$_

General Damages

$_

TOTAL
DATED t h i s

5~&

$

day of

4

fti

fr/Mbl

, 1992.

EXHIBIT H
EXCERPT FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS
(R 324 - 326)
(R 329)
(R 331-332; 334)
(R 358)
(R 376)
(R 397)
(R 645)
(R 735 - 747)
(R 775)
(R 792)

t

it

I

2

AMY

if

it

N E L S O N , having been duly summoned and sworn as

3

a witness on behalf of the Plaintiff, took the stand and testified

4

as follows:

5

DIRECT EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. HANSEN:

7

Q

Will you please state your full name for the jury?

8

A

Amy Nelson.

9

THE COURT:

Ms. Nelson, you'll have to move up to

10

the mike, if you will, please, and speak right into it so

11

we can all hear you.

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

14

Q

15

address?

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Can you get up there?
Kind of.

That's better

(By Mr. Hansen:)

Ms. Nelson, what is your present

A

4001 East Prospector Drive*

Q

Is that with your parents that you reside?

A

Yes, that's correct.

Q

So you're single; is that right?

A

That's correct.

Q

You recall this accident that occurred in July of

1989; is that right?
A

Right.

Q

And am I correct that on that morning you had taken

your fiance to the airport to go back to Minnesota or wherever

03^4

1

he was from?

2

A

That's correct.

3

Q

What time was that that you took him to the airport?

4

A

From what I remember, I believe it was about 7:30,

5

something like that.

6

Q

Ycu recall what time this accident occurred?

7

A

Around 8:30, 9.

8

Q

And from 7:30 until the time of the accident, you

9

I were just driving around; is that correct?

10

A

That's correct.

11

Q

I see.

12

time until you had to be to work at ten o'clock; is that

13

right?

14

A

That's right.

15

Q

Okay, and it's also correct, isn't it, that you'd

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

You indicated you were trying to kill some

never been on this road before?
A

That's correct.

Q

And the read we're referring to is Canyon Road?

A

Right.

Q

Is that your -- is that correct?

A

Right, that's correct.

Q

Okay, and do you remember having your deposition

taken on July 2nd, 1991?
A

I do.

Q

Do you remember that?

0325

1

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

2

Q

At that time you indicated that ycu were thinking

3

I you'd go look at some homes behind the Capitol? is that
right?

6

A

That's right.

Q

Were you looking at homes at the time that this

I accident occurred?
8

A

No.

9

Q

Now, you were proceeding in somewhat of a northbound

10

direction on Canyon Road; is that right?

11

A

That's right.

12

Q

Did you observe the "Stop Ahead" sign as you were

13

driving northbound on Canyon Road before reaching the

14

intersection with Third Avenue?

15

A

I don't remember.

Q

You don't remember seeing it, do you?

A

No, I don't.

Q

And you didn't see the "Stop" sign, did you?

A

No, I didn't.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. HANSEN:

Your Honor, for clarification, I was not

expecting we'd get to witnesses this morning.

I was going

to call Newell Knight as our first witness and admit this
exhibit that he took a photograph of and I've shewn it to
counsel.

I think he's stipulated that he has no objection

to that, provided that Mr. Knight testifies that that's a

0326J
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1

A

No, not exactly.

2

Q

Is it your testimony that you -- that the "Stop" sign

3

was partially obstructed*?

4

A

It is.

5

Q

How clear are you on that recollection?

6

A

Pretty clear.

7

Q

At the time of your deposition you indicated that you

8

were somewhat vague about your recollection.

9 |
10

MR. STEVENS:

referring to, counsel?

11
12

Can you tell me what page you're

MR. HANSEN:

I was asking her a question specifically--)

let's turn to page 34 of your deposition then.

13

THE COURT:

Better give her a copy of it, counsel.

14

Q

15

question, let me just ask, there was an investigating

16

officer from Salt Lake City Police there at the scene of the

(By Mr. Hansen:)

Let me first ask before I get to thi^

17

I accident; isn't that right?

18

IA

That's right

19

»Q

Were there more than one, do you recall?

20

I A

I believe there were two.

21

Q

22

those officers that there was any obstruction of the "Stop"

23

J sign?

24

I A

25

Q

Okay, and isn't it true that you didn't tell either of

That's true.
Well, let me look -- let me have you look at page 34

0329I
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1

A

That's r i g h t .

2

Q

Now, you indicate you applied your brakes in full;

3

is that right?

4

A

That's right.

5

Q

How quickly did you stop before the accident

6

occurred?

7

A

Excuse me?

8

Q

What distance did you start applying your brakes

9

before the accident occurred?

10

A

As soon as I saw the "Stop" sign.

11

Q

Pardon?

12

A

I must have been out in the intersection, I suppose.

13

I don't know.

14
15

MR. HANSEN:
it should be.

16

I'm having a hard time hearing the witness.

THE COURT:

17

keep your voice up.

18

THE WITNESS:

19

Im Y

20

Your Honor, my hearing's not the best that

Speak right into the mike, please, and

After I <saw the "Stop" sign, I put on

brakes and also when I saw Julie Turner's car coming.
THE COURT:

I'm having a problem hearing you , too.

21

If you 1 11 speak right up into the mike.

22

to move up closer to the mike .

23

I might add.

24
25

Maybe you'.LI have

It's not a very goo<i mike.

Go ahead, counsel.
Q

(By Mr. Hansen:)

All right.

You said after you saw

0331
9

the "Step" sign?
A

After I saw the "Step" sign,

Q

And at what point did yeu see the "Step" sign?

A

When I was-- I don't know.

Q

So the "Step" sign wasn't obstructed then at seme

pcit when yeu looked at it,
7

I A

8

Q

9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Well, that's right.
Okay, but I've got to get this straight because

I initially you indicated that yeu didn't see the "Step" sign.
Then ycu testified ycu did see the "Step" sign, and then
you're also saying it was partially obstructed.
A

Which is it?

Well, them's a point that you could see it, but you

couldn't see it until you come right up en it because -I don't know, it's just -- I just -- that's all I can
remember, I guess.
Q

You've also testified it was partial^obstructed.

A

Right.

Q

Was it three-quarters obstructed?

Half obstructed?

What did yeu observe?
A

Between three-fourths and half, I would think.

Q

So in other words, yeu could still see half of the

"Stop" sign?
A

Between three-fourths and half.

Q

Okay, and you're not claiming that the "Stop ahead"

25

sign was obstructed, are you?

0332
10

1 I Q

So you had gone into the Third Avenue intersection

2

before you ever saw the plaintiff?

3

A

That's right.

4

Q

And I guess you just didn't have enough time to get

5

any

6

A

7

estimates as to her speed; isn't that right?
That's right.
MR. HANSEN:

8

I think that's all the questions I have

right now, your Honor.

9 J

THE COURT: All right.

You don't have any examination

of this witness at this time, do you, Mr. Stevens?

10
11

Well, I'm not asking if you want to take a break or

12

not.

13

if you're going to have any cross-examinationof your own

We're going to break now, but I was simply inquiring

14

I witness.

15

I

16

I However, I don't know how you've ruled on that as far as my

17

MR. STEVENS:

I thought that I would, your Honor.

ability to recall her.

18

THE COURT:

19

her.

20

want to.

21

I haven't ruled on your ability to recall

She's your witness. You can call her whenever you

MR. STEVENS: All right.

22

I would like to ask her a

couple of questions.

23

THE COURT: Well, we'll recess at this point.

24

I do that after we come back.

25

•

You may

Members of the jury, we're going to recess until 1:30

0334
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1

MR. HANSEN:

And your Honor, I guess last night as

2

I was researching this, I came up with a case that hadn't

3

been cited and I think it's directly on point with the

4

Court's ruling, Davidson v. Prince, a 1991 Court of Appeals

5

opinion that I wanted to make sure that I didn't misrepresent

6

anything in our argument, and I think the Court's ruling is

7

correctly reflective of the Davidson opinion and we will

8

follow that.

9

THE COURT:

10

All right, Counsel.

MR. STEVENS:

Your Honor, if I understand correctly

11

then, and really, I don't have a problem with your Honor's

12

ruling on this either.

13

was negligent or to compare the negligence or who was at

14

fault.

15

concern.

I heard experts in the past asked who

Those would not be permitted, and that was my

16

THE COURT:

Okay, I won't allow that.

The expert,

17

however, assuming there's a proper foundation laid, may

18

testify with regard to his opinion regarding the cause of the

19

accident.

20

MR. HANSEN:

May I ask for one more clarification

21

on that ruling?

I guess my question is to specifically ask

22

him what each driver may have done to contribute to the cause

23

of the accident, is that appropriate?

24

THE COURT:

That's fair.

25

All right, this issue on the motion for

1

apportionment of fault on the part of Salt Lake City, a non-

2

party to this action, I've reviewed both of your memoranda

3

regarding that issue and I am of the view, Counsel, that

4

while, as I interpret it, there are no appellate decisions

5

dealing with that issue in Utah —

6I

MR. STEVENS:

7

nothing, your Honor*

8

THE COURT:

9

am I correct about that?

I think that we've both cited

It's my view that the purpose of the

No-Fault Act has to do with assuring that no party will be

10

responsible to pay more than their appropriate share of the

11

fault causing the accident, and given that overview, it seems

12

to me that policy consideration behind the act, it seems to

13

me that in these circumstances it's a fair request that Salt

14

Lake City be considered on the apportionment portion of the

15

verdict for purposes of assessing all of the fault that may

16

have contributed to the cause of this accident, so your

17

request, Mr. Stevens, to allow Salt Lake City to be named on

18

the verdict form only as a contributor, potential contributor

19

to the accident, is granted.

20

MR. STEVENS:

21

THE COURT: All Tight, Counsel.

22

Thank you, your Honor.
If there's nothing

further --

23

MR. STEVENS:

24

Honor.

25

was regarding a late —

There was one additional item, your

I think we sent out a notice of hearing on it. That

1

Now, those are the facts as far as who's at fault*

2

Our position is, and I think you'll find, that there was some

3

obstruction of that stop sign and that to say this is just an

4

ordinary running through a stop sign is not the case.

5

had cases like that before, but here we have an eyewitness

6

who was there, who checked.

7

I've

I think you'll also find that Julie Turner was

8

probably going a little bit faster than she should have been,

9

and the really sad part about it is if Julie Turner had

10

gotten on her brakes just a little bit sooner or had been

11 I traveling just a little bit slower, the cars never would have
12

come together.

13

Likewise, I'll have to admit, had Amy Nelson been

14

able to see that stop sign 20 feet sooner and gotten on the

15

brakes that much sooner, the cars would not have come

16

together.

17

Judge wouldn't be here, but that's not what happened.

18

think the real fault here that —

19

Salt Lake City.

20

signed.

21

You would not be here.

I would not be here, the
I

we're suggesting is with

It's a bad design.

They didn't have it well

Now, Plaintiff *ia$ talked about the injuries.

22

After this accident occurred, Julie Turner had her step-

23

daughter with her in the cat.

24

hurt.

she was not hurt.

Amy was not

She, as a matter of fact, had forgotten to put on her

25 I seat belt.

She was thrown forward a little and bumped her

037?
1:24

1

A

Okay.

2

Q

Let me just ask you, Mr, Knight, in regards to

3

accident reconstruction, is traffic sign obstruction some-

4

thing that reconstructionists deal with?

5

A

Oh, absolutely.

That is part of reconstruction.

6

If a sign is covered, if it isn't covered, how is it covered,

7

why was it covered, what's the configuration of the streets

8

—

that's just typical of what you do.

9

Q

What about an investigating officer?

Is that

10

something that an investigating officer to an accident deals

11

with?

12

A

Sure.

13

Q

And are they expected to report whether there's

14
15

obstructions of traffic signs?
A

There's no question about it.

In fact, on the

16

accident report itself there's a section that you put down if

17

you have obstructions.

18

there's an obstruction, you put it down.

It's specifically requested if

19

Q

What about with regards to this accident?

20

A

They should have put it down if there's an

21

obstruction.

22

Q

What did they put down?

23

A

Well, they didn't

24

MR. STEVENS:

25

THE COURT:

~

Your Honor, I object.

Counsel, the exhibit hasn't been
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1

A

I did.

2

Q

But it's also true that you never told Officer Paul

3

or any of the other investigating officers at the scene that

4

you observed any obstruction of the stop sign; isn't that

5

true?

6

A

That's correct.

7

Q

And isn't it true that the reason why you didn't

8

tell any of the officers about the obstruction is you didn't

9

think it was significant; isn't that what you testified to in

10
11
12

your deposition?
A

That's correct, and I think I said that I was

planning on taking care of it.

13

Q

But you didn't tell the police —

14

A

No.

15

Q

—

16

anything about that, right?

Now, you've said you didn't see the stop ahead

17

sign.

You weren't aware of the stop ahead sign at that time;

18

isn't that right?

19

A

Correct.

20

Q

And wasn't it your testimony in your deposition

21

that the reason why you say you weren't aware if that stop

22

ahead sign was there or not is because you didn't travel that

23

road northbound.

24

A

Correct.

25

Q

Wasn't that your deposition testimony?
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1

this patient.

2

Q

Do you feel any doubt about that opinion?

3

A

No question, no doubt.

4

MR. STEVENS:

5

THE COURT:

6 1

MR. HANSEN:

7

THE COURT:

8

That's all I have.

All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Hansen?

No cross-examination.
All right, Doctor, you're free to go.

Thank you.

9

That concludes your evidence, does it not?

10

MR. STEVENS:

That does, your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. STEVENS: We do.

13

THE COURT:

The Defense rests?

Members of the jury, I have a matter of

14

law now to discuss with counsel outside your presence, so I

15

will excuse you. We'll tell you when it's time to come back

16

in.

Remember the admonition I've given you.

17

(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.)

18

THE COURT:

19

Counsel, this is the time that I indicated I would

20

hear from you with regard to the Plaintiff's filed motion to

21

allow a newly discovered witness to be called as rebuttal or

22

in the case in chief.

23

Mr. Hansen.

24
25

The jury has exited the courtroom.

You may proceed if you wish,

I've reviewed your motion and affidavit.

MR. HANSEN:

Yes, your Honor, and I think the basis

for seeking to call this rebuttal witness was set forth in
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1

the motion and my affidavit.

Since the time that motion and

2

affidavit has been filed, I think there's further strong

3

evidence and reason for why this rebuttal witness is neces-

4

sary and critical to the Plaintiff's proper presentation of

5

her case.

6

witness for the Defense and Mr. Guertz was identified as a

7

witness on the Defendant's exhibit list which was timely

8

filed, but also was after the time of discovery cutting off,

9

so there was no opportunity for us to depose Mr. Guertz. We

Specifically, Mr. Guertz testified yesterday as a

10

were aware that Mr. Guertz might testify that it was his

11

impression that the —

12

sign.

13

testimony that the stop sign had been changed, may have been

14

moved.

15

my written memoranda but I think are additional reasons why

16

this witness is so critical to rebut the testimony that the

17

Defendant has put on in the presentation of its case.

18

there was obstruction of the stop

We've never heard that Mr. Guertz was going to render

Those are additional matters that aren't addressed in

I have provided some authority from cases outside

19

of the state of Utah when I hurriedly put together my motion

20

to allow this new witness.

21

Additionally, last night I quickly tried to

22

research the issue with regards to Utah law and I think the

23

case that may be most helpful or as close as I was quickly

24

able to find is State v. Albretsen and that is 782 P.2d 515.

25

It's a Utah 1989 case before the Utah Supreme Court.

In that
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1

case the Supreme Court held that the trial court had acted

2

within its discretion in allowing a rebuttal witness to

3

testify and this was a criminal matter, even though the

4

prosecuting attorney had not notified the defendant before

5

trial that the witness would testify to contradict and

6

impeach defendant's alibi testimony.

7

evidence developed during the course of trial and that the

8

prosecutor identified the possible rebuttal witness as soon

9

as it was —

It says that the

in good faith, it says, as soon as the need

10

became known, and I think we've complied with that in this

11

case.

12

As I saw the change in the posture of the case and

13

especially with Mr. Guertzfs testimony and also Daniel

14

Rusk's, we just believe it is very critical and we identified

15

this new witness as soon as we were able to and I think we're

16

entitled to put him on.

17

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Hansen.

18

Mr. Stevens, do you wish to respond?

19

MR. STEVENS:

20

The Court ordered an exchange of witnesses on

I certainly do, your Honor.

21

February 14th.

There had already been interrogatories back

22

and forth about who witnesses would be and some informal

23

designation that Mr. Hansen and I had sent each letters or

24

spoken on the phone about.

25

tion.

We complied with that designa-

Mr. Hansen didn't but filed the designation late. Our
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1
2

designation went out February 14th.
I believe Mr. Hansen was aware —

if we1re talking

3

now that Mr. Guertz is a surprise, and that's a new argument

4

to me, he was aware of Mr. Guertzfs involvement before that,

5

I believe, but certainly by February 14th.

6

lutely no effort to seek any deposition of Mr. Guertz or ask

7

what he might have to say.

8

me what he thought Mr. Knight was going to say and I gave him

9

an outline generally of what Mr. Guertz was going to say, but

There was abso-

We spoke on the phone.

He told

10

no effort to depose him, no effort at all to find out what

11

was up with him.

12

Now, Mr. Guertz testified, I'll agree, that the

13

sign post had been replaced.

14

That opinion, as I see it, goes only to the validity of the

15

photographs that have come in, not to anything else, and

16

we've all agreed that the photographs that came in don't

17

necessarily represent the scene at the time anyway, so I

18

don't see how there's any surprise there, nor did Mr. Guertz

19

even offer the opinion that it had been moved, just that it

20

could have been.

21

That would be his opinion.

I think we get beck to the basic issue in this case

22

which is, was the sign obstructed or not, and Mr. Hansen

23

claims there's some big surprise and prejudice to him because

24

Salt Lake City's going to be on the verdict.

25

Honor, that just isn't true, and the fact is this case was

Well, your
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1

filed back in March '91. In April we raised the issue of

2

third-party fault*

3

saying the tree obstructed the stop sign.

4

Plaintiff's deposition was taken and we went over and over

5

the tree in front of the stop sign.

6

In May we sent interrogatory answers
In July

We had anticipated calling Mr. Rusk all along.

7

Mr. Hansen didn't set his deposition to find out what he had

8

to say.

9

deposition and we took his deposition in January.

I don't know if he contacted him, but I set his
At that

10

time Mr. Rusk testified as he did in court that the tree

11

obstructed the stop sign.

12

May of last year that the obstruction of that stop sign was

13

an issue.

14

somebody, he had ample time to do so.

15

July.

16

Mr. Hansen has known from at least

If he needed to go out and get a witness and find
It was reinforced in

It was further reinforced in January.
It appears to me that what happened was on the day

17

of trial, the night of the first day of trial, they make an

18

effort to go find somebody and they've dug someone up. I

19

haven't seen the person.

20

no opportunity to depose him.

21

find out at all what this person plans on testifying to. I

22

don't know if he's — what his basis would be to testify, and

23

to say that now you can come in at this date and essentially

24

run rampant through everybody's trial prep, the whole theory

25

of the case that we presented in our opening statement and

I don't know who he is.

I've had

I've had no opportunity to
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1

say we have to bring in this new witness because of surprise,

2

I think is absolutely ridiculous.

3

if the argument Mr. Hansen makes is, well, you

4

added Salt Lake City on the verdict so that justifies this,

5

that makes no sense, your Honor.

6

added to the verdict, he knew that the position we were

7

taking was that Salt Lake City was 100 percent responsible

8

and he was going to have to anticipate contesting with that

9

issue, that Salt Lake City was at fault and Amy was not. He

Up until Salt Lake City was

10

needed evidence on that and he knew he needed evidence on

11

that.

12

The fact that now we have a situation where we're

13

saying, well, maybe Salt Lake City's only 90 percent instead

14

of a hundred percent, that doesn't change the investigation

15

he needs to make.

16

the jury as far as was it obstructed or wasn't it obstructed.

17

That issue has been here for months, almost a year, and to

18

come in now and say well, we ran around after trial ended and

19

we came up with a guy with no explanation as to why they

20

couldn't have found such a person months ago, I think, does

21

not meet any sort of standard.

22

That doesn't change the issues in front of

Now, the case that he's just cited, this criminal

23

case, State v. Albretsen, refers to allowing a witness in

24

when there's some surprise in the trial, when it's because of

25

some new evidentiary matter that comes up. Well, if we had
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1

surprise him, if we hadn't said we're claiming the stop

2

sign's blocked and if we walked in the first day of trial and

3

Amy for the first time said, "Well, I think there were trees

4

in front of it," then he'd have a position and then he'd be

5

able to say surprise, "I've got to get something and you've

6

got to let me get a witness because my trial prep has been

7

disorganized because of you, defendant's, actions," but

8

that's not the case we've got here.

9

The case is that we have both known of this issue

10

for a long, long time and it's not proper to go get somebody

11

at the last minute.

12

that he's cited where he put in the cite from A.L.R.4th, even

13

those cases refer to a test of whether the need could have

14

reasonably been anticipated, and in this case, it could have

15

been, and in cases that do allow this kind of surprise

16

witness, seems to me to say you've got to have a continuance

17

then and we've got to go out and have an opportunity to

18

depose this new person, if there is some justification for

19

letting him in.

20

side wants.

21

witness on us now is not fair to us.

22

I think if the Court —

even the cases

I think a continuance is not what either

It's not fair to us and I think to shove a new

I'd cite the Court —

the quick research that I was

23

able to get done this morning —

to 63 A.L.R.4th, section 16.

24

It's the same A.L.R. cite.

25

upholding a denial or reversing the allowance of such a

There is a listing of cases
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1

witness when it has a prejudicial effect on the trial prepa-

2

ration and strategy of the other party, and that's exactly

3

what we've got here.

4

We built our case, we put it together, we got

5

witnesses.

They apparently didn't.

6

but it's certainly not our fault and we shouldn't bear the

7

burden of it.

8

Thank you, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. HANSEN:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. HANSEN:

I don't know why not,

All right, thank you, Mr. Stevens.
May I respond?
Yes, you may, Mr. Hansen.
Your Honor, when Mr. Stevens says that

13

a year ago this was a big issue and it was well known, I

14

would go back to asking why was it that Mr. Stevens waited

15

until six days before trial to file his motion to add Salt

16

Lake City to the special jury verdict?

17

As I previously argued, I think the statute indi-

18

cates that they shouldn't bring them in for purposes of the

19

apportionment of fault.

20

before trial, he made his motion, and on the morning of

21

trial, the Court in an effort to be fair, stating that the

22

Court felt that the statutory scheme is to avoid any party

23

being responsible for more than its proportionate share,

24

allowed that to occur.

25

of fairness to the parties.

That was not done, but six days

I submit that that was in an attempt
I don't believe it was timely
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1

done by Mr. Stevens.

2

Now he's turning the tables and trying to say that

3

because his approach, that he's granted on the morning of

4

trial, the opportunity to point to Salt Lake City as some

5

defendant who isn't even here in essence, and he wants to

6

argue now that we shouldn't be able to try to respond to that

7

change of circumstances, I think is unfair prejudice to my

8

client.

9
10
11

I'd also submit that rebuttal testimony doesn't
have to be based on surprise.
There's also the Utah case of Board of Education of

12

South Sanpete v. Barton which is at 617 P.2d 347.

I do have

13

a copy, your Honor.

In that case the Court talks about

14

rebuttal witnesses.

It says, "Rebuttal evidence is that

15

which tends to refute or to so modify or explain as to

16

nullify or minimize the effect of the opponent's evidence."

17

Now, I submit that there is considerable evidence

18

that the Defendant has presented in their case that I think

19

we're entitled to present rebuttal testimony and some of it

20

is surprise.

21

some statement that the sitjn may have been bent, that he now

22

says that he thinks that sign was replaced, that is new and

23

that is surprising and we have a witness who's prepared to

24

rebut most of the — most, if not all, of the points of the

25

Defendant with regards to the obstruction of the stop sign,

Mr. Guertz's testimony that because there was
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1

with regards to whether it was in a bent and improper con-

2

dition, and we submit that it is critical that we be allowed

3

to call this witness in the interest of fairness and accord-

4

ing to the rules.

5

THE COURT:

Counsel, I am persuaded that the motion

6

to call the new witness should be and is denied, and my

7

reasoning is as has been stated by Mr. Stevens, but moreover,

8

it has been the essential defense here that the sign was

9

obstructed, thereby limiting the Defendant's opportunity to

10

timely observe it and take appropriate action.

That aspect

11

of the Guertz testimony is not new, and my decision to allow

12

Salt Lake City on the verdict form for purposes of apportion-

13

ment of the responsibility here really does not change the

14

essential defense that the sign was obstructed.

15

here has been made that that was a fact and evidence has been

16

adduced, if it's believable to the jury, that that was the

17

fact, and now at this point, this late date, it seems to me

18

that it puts the Plaintiff at an unfair disadvantage, not

19

knowing who this individual is and having had the opportunity

20

to cross-examine or at least depose this witness, while as

21

Mr. Guertz was available ajxd notified in a timely fashion as

22

far as the opposition was concerned, that he would be testi-

23

fying.

24

Plaintiff in an unfair posture to grant this motion and it's

25

denied.

The claim

I am therefore persuaded that it would place the

0744
111:51

1

MR* HANSEN:

2

THE COURT:

3

sustained.

4
5

You mean the Defendant?
Excuse me, the Defendant's position is

Your motion is denied.
Let's now repair to chambers and work on

Instructions.

6 1

MR. HANSEN:

Your Honor, if I may, I would move fo

7

a continuance and request that Defendant be given the oppor-

8

tunity to depose this rebuttal witness.

9

mony is critical.

I think this testi-

I believe it is essential that we be able

10

to allow this rebuttal testimony and if the Court's position

11

is that there's unfair timing on this, then we would will-

12

ingly agree and would move for a continuance of the trial to

13

allow sufficient time for Mr. Stevens to take this deposi-

14

tion, which my direct testimony on him is not going to be any

15

more than 20 minutes, so 10 to 20 minutes, so I don't think

16

it would be a long deposition.

17

the noon hour or whenever the Court would desire, but I'd

18

move for a continuance, your Honor.

19
20

THE COURT:

No.

I think we could take it over

For the reasons stated, Counsel,

your request for a continuance is denied.

21

We will now rece-ss and work on our Instructions.

22

MR. HANSEN:

23
24
25

evidence?

One more — may I proffer the

We have the witness here.
THE COURT:

Well, I think his proposed evidence is

basically set forth in your motion and your affidavit.

He
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will testify the sign wasn't obstructed.
MR. HANSEN:

And in talking with him, he would give

more detail than what I provided in the affidavit.
like to proffer a Mr. Jim Nakling —

I would

and I found his name is

spelled N-a-k-1-i-n-g, and he resides at 122 North Canyon
Road, one house away from the stop sign, and his testimony is
that for the past 10 years he has walked his dogs past that
stop sign two times per day on a usual day and he has never
seen any obstruction of that stop sign.

The tree to which it

is alleged obstructed the stop sign has never been cut.

The

tree in front of his house has never been cut in the past 10
years that he's been there and furthermore, the stop sign has
never been changed and he's never observed it bent during the
past seven or eight years.
He will further testify that the stop ahead sign
which is somewhat in dispute as to when it was placed there,
he will testify that that stop ahead sign has been there, as
has the stop sign, since the road was repaired after the
floods of 1983, so this is all of the testimony that I think
is essential that this witness would testify about.
THE COURT:

Wellf, and that's fine.

It seems to me

that insofar as the dispute about the condition of the
visibility of the sign is concerned, we do have conflicting
evidence on both sides, that Mr. Nakling's testimony would be
duplicative of that, and that's what I perceive to be the
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1

principle issue here and not whether or not the sign was bent

2

or removed, so my ruling will stand, Counsel.

3

Let's now recess.

4

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

5

THE COURT:

6

The jury, parties and counsel are

present.

7

Instructions to the jury.

8

MR. STEVENS:

9

Your Honor, one preliminary matter

your clerk called to my attention.

There are a couple of

10

exhibits that she didn't have a formal ruling on.

11

was 42 and —

12

THE CLERK:

13

MR. STEVENS:

14

Twenty-five through 39.
I think we both agreed that those

would come in.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. HANSEN:

17

THE COURT:

18

I think it

That's correct.
That's correct.
Very well, those exhibits will be

received.

19

MR. STEVENS:

20

THE COURT:

21

(Whereupon, Judgp Frederick read aloud Instructions

22
23
24
25

Thank you, your Honor.

All right.

Thank you.

to the jury.)
THE COURT:

Counsel, you may present your closing

arguments.
How much time do you anticipate, Mr. Hansen?
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1

going any speed, and she would have stopped and there would

2

have been no accident.

3

ent, I don't think.

4

That's my point.

I'm not inconsist-

Now, Mr. Hansen makes a big issue of the fact that

5

Mr. Guertz says he can't say speed was a factor, but the fact

6

is all Mr. Guertz can analyze is the crush of the autos which

7

he came out at five miles per hour each on, and Mr. Knight

8

essentially agrees and he doesn't have information on speed,

9

if she was going 60 and slowed down and got going to five

10

miles per hour.

11

the time.

12

noted on the police report," but keep in mind, ladies and

13

gentlemen, that both of these people told the cops, "I'm not

14

hurt," and this was not a big accident.

15

involved accident investigation.

16

accident, so when we look at Plaintiff's own testimony, it

17

appears there's some fault there.

18

All he knows is that's what she was doing at

He said, "Well, gee, there weren't any skid marks

This was not an

It was a minor intersection

The prime fault, as Mr. Hansen mentions, and I

19

agree, is Salt Lake City.

The prime fault for the sign. The

20

instruction you've got in the package the Judge will give you

21

says they have to maintain, the sign and the evidence is

22

undisputed they didn't.

23

That's what the prime fault of this accident is, and I

24

understand that Julie Turner didn't realize that and for

25

years she's been angry at Amy Nelson and assumed that she

It was covered.

It was blocked.
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the evidence.

If you find the evidence preponderates in

favor of the issue presented, answer yes.

if you find the

evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a
preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the
evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer
no.

Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a prepon-

derance of the evidence.
Number one, considering all of the evidence in this
case, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
the Defendant, Amy Nelson, was negligent as alleged by the
Plaintiff?

Answer, no.

Dated this 5th day of March, 1992,

signed by the foreperson.
THE COURT:

Counsel, do you wish to have the jury

polled, Mr. Hansen?
MR. HANSEN:

Yes, we do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Members of the jury, I'll ask you one
question, to which you will answer either yes or no, and that
question is, was this and is this your verdict, Mr. Little?
MR. LITTLE: Yes.
THE COURT:

Ms. Adams?

MS. ADAMS: Yes.,
THE COURT:

Ms. Hill?

MS. HILL: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Watson?
MR. WATSON: Yes.
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